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Ophiocordyceps sinensis (English: caterpillar fungus), 
locally known as yarshagumba, is a fungus, which 
grows in the body of a larva of a moth in the high 
alpine grasslands of the Himalayan region between 
3200 and 5000 meter above sea level. It is found in 
some parts of the Tibetan Plateau and in the Himala-
yan Mountains of Bhutan, India and Nepal (Shrestha 
and Bawa 2014; Winkler 2009). Collected from May 
to July, this non-timber forest product is traded as 
medicinal product mainly to China. The price in-
creased tremendously in the late 1990s (Winkler 
2008; Yeh and Lama 2013), which triggered a “gold 
rush” and led to the development of new collection 
sites in the Himalayan Mountains (see pictures 1 to 
4). A product unknown by local communities has 
transformed into a high value resource changing 
livelihood strategies of entire villages within only ten 
to fifteen years (Shrestha and Bawa 2014). These 
developments have evoked institutional issues and 
power struggles in the rural communities. New and 
old actors have increasingly questioned existing 
governance systems regulating livestock grazing and 
the access to these high alpine grasslands. 
 
 
Figure 1: Yarshagumba collectors with camping lug-
gage (May 2017) 
 
The tremendous increase of people accessing the 
grasslands for the collection of yarshagumba, related 
conflicts, and the high dependency of collectors on 
yarshagumba harvest for cash income are challenges 
faced in most of the collection sites in the region. 
Additionally, the local population perceives that 
their habitats are degrading the yarshagumba har-
vest per collector is declining. These are all aspects 
analysed by several scholars (cf. Cannon et al. 2009; 
Negi et al. 2016; Pant et al. 2017; Shrestha and Bawa 
2013; Weckerle et al. 2010).  
 
Figure 2: Yarshagumba (ophiocordyceps sinensis) 
(May 2017) 
Yet, while most of these studies focus on the analysis 
of the socio-economic and ecological situation 
and/or management structures in one particular 
valley or collection site, the institutional frame of 
yarshagumba collection is rarely examined. Govern-
ance systems of different collection sites are hardly 
ever compared in the literature.  
Using the conceptual frameworks of “the governance 
of commons” (Agrawal 2003; Dietz et al. 2003; Folke 
et al. 2005; Ostrom 1990; Pahl-Wostl 2009) and 
“hybrid governance” (German and Keeler 2010) we 
compare the governance systems of yarshagumba 
collection in two different legal settings of Nepal and 
India in the border region of the Kailash Landscape.  




Figure 3: Yarshagumba campsite in Nepal (May 2017) 
We analyse governmental actors and institutions in 
the two countries, and focus on actual communal ar-
rangements regulating the access to and management 
of yarshagumba collection on the ground. The com-
parative study provides insights into the dynamics, 
changes and limitations of the governance systems 
established since the discovery of yarshagumba.  
The empirical fieldwork was conducted in four val-
leys of the Kailash Landscape. In total, we assessed 
seven collection sites in two valleys of the Api Nam-
pa Conservation Area (Nepal) and two valleys in the 
Kumaon Region (India). The qualitative empirical 
research comprised mainly key informant and in-
depth interviews, focus group discussions and par-
ticipatory field observations.  
 
Yarshagumba is a common pool resource. This kind of 
resources is defined through subtractability – if the 
resource is consumed by one person it cannot be con-
sumed by another one anymore – and the difficulty to 
exclude other people to have access and use the re-
source (Ostrom 1990). The key concern with com-
mons is that users try to maximize their benefit per 
unit, while ignoring involved costs per unit imposed on 
others. Users tend to pursue their short-term interests, 
which results in outcomes that are not in anyone’s 
long-term interest, like the complete exploitation of 
the resource (Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 1990).  
Dietz et al. (2003) argue that local communities can 
manage common pool resources effectively, while 
they usually fail when sudden changes occur. There-
fore, researchers plead for more complex govern-
ance systems (Dietz et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005), 
linking and combining governmental actors, re-
search facilities and communal institutions to over-
come challenges that are the result of depending 
only on one single governance regime (German and 
Keeler 2010; Pahl-Wostl 2009). 
 
Figure 4: Yarshagumba collectors in Nepal (May 
2017) 
Governmental actors are likely to face challenges 
regarding the enforcement of rights or resentments 
by holders of customary rights. At the same time, 
communal arrangements have usually difficulties 
with applying sanctions and adjusting to rapid 
changes when new drivers and actors are intro-
duced. Thus, hybrid natural resource governance 
systems are needed, which are characterized by a 
balance between local self-organization and gov-
ernmental regulations as complementary instru-
ments of governance (German and Keeler 2010).  
Before yarshagumba was discovered in the Himala-
yan Mountains, the collection sites were common 
grazing grounds for the local population. Well-
defined boundaries, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
monitoring and graduated sanctions (Acheson 2006; 
Ostrom 1990) were principles integrated in the local 
governance systems managing grazing. Additionally, 
social homogeneity of users, community sense and 
social capital made rule devising and enforcement 
possible. However, these local systems now struggle 
with new and old actors demanding access to the 
yarshagumba collection sites, and with community 
members ignoring social norms to increase their 
own benefits.  
In Nepal the collection and sale of yarshagumba is legal 
for local communities, whereas in India the extraction 
of yarshagumba is happening in a legal grey zone. 
Government institutions in India and Nepal have for-
mulated guidelines, but struggle with their implemen-
tation and often neglect local contexts. Communities 
have created site-specific arrangements since the late 
1990s to deal with the pressure and to control and 
limit access for people from other communities. The 
limited formalisation of these arrangements leads to 
disputes and makes collectors vulnerable to criminal 
elements and ambiguous institutional and individual 
behaviour. Additionally, it encourages unsustainable 
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harvesting of the resource and rapid habitat degra-
dation.  
In sum, our data shows that the governance systems 
in India and Nepal regulating yarshagumba collec-
tion are a complex blend of governmental actors and 
institutions on various scales and local communal 
arrangements adapted to the characteristics of each 
site. Against this background, we argue that neither 
the sole existence of governmental actors and their 
formal institutions nor community arrangements 
alone are sufficient for the effective governance of 
yarshagumba collection in the remote high alpine 
grasslands. Instead, they need to be complementary 
(German and Keeler 2010). New actors and drivers 
stimulate changes and, thereby, put pressure on the 
existing governance systems. It requires more com-
plex and adaptive governance systems to be flexible 
and robust to sudden changes.  
Yarshagumba collection sites in the Himalayan 
mountains of India and Nepal have experienced a 
“gold rush” in recent years, which has evoked institu-
tional issues and power struggles in the rural com-
munities. In this context, there is a need to create a 
system to govern these collection sites that builds on 
trust, open communication and cooperation between 
the community and the government. We recom-
mend, as a starting point, to establish common plat-
forms for stakeholders from different levels and 
sectors from the government, relevant research facil-
ities and communities on the regional level in both 
countries. Joint meetings could encourage exchange 
and understanding, create awareness and provide 
the opportunity to share local and scientific 
knowledge among relevant stakeholders. Establish-
ing learning loops is important to be able to adjust to 
uncertainties and changes in the future – today, yar-
shagumba has a high market price; tomorrow it 
might be another natural resource.  
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